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Notes
An Evaluation of The Federal Employees
Liability Reform And Tort Compensation
Act: Congress' Response to Westfall v.
Erwin
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Congress enacted legislation immunizing federal em-
ployees from liability for common law torts committed within the
scope of their employment. This legislation, known as the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Act),' was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision issued in
Westfall v. Erwin on January 13, 1988.2 In Westfall, the Court se-
verely restricted the scope of protection afforded to federal employ-
ees from common law tort liability, especially lower level employees,
the "rank and file" workers.'
Prior to the Westfall decision, a federal employee's actions were
absolutely protected from common law tort liability when the acts
complained of were within the perimeter of the employee's official
duties. In Westfall the Court departed from this general rule by
1. 134 CONG. REc. S7668 (daily ed. June 13, 1988).
2. 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
3. 134 CONG. REc. S7668 (daily ed. June 13, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Grassley). See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Westfall.
4. 134 CONG. REC. H4719 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Moor-
head). For a thorough discussion on the absolute immunity of federal officials and em-
ployees see Comment, Tort Immunity of Federal Executive Officials: The Mutable
Scope of Absolute Immunity, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 285 (1984).
adding an additional requirement for immunity when a federal em-
ployee is sued in her personal capacity; to be immunized from liabil-
ity an employee must have acted within the scope of her employment
and must have exercised governmental discretion. The increased
possible exposure of lower level federal employees to ruinous per-
sonal liability after Westfall prompted the introduction of reform
legislation, House of Representatives Bill 4612, which was ultimately
passed as the Act.
As passed, the Act removes Westfall liability, and instead provides
that the exclusive remedy for such torts is through an action against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).6 The
FTCA was amended, as a result of the Act, to substitute the United
States as the sole defendant in any action against a federal employee
acting within the scope of employment, and to permit the United
States to assert any defenses based on judicial or legislative immu-
nity which could have been raised by the employee.7
Although the Act is a knight in shining armor to the federal work
force, the federal government may now continue to escape liability
from its own negligence through the discretionary function loophole
in the FTCA. This Note presents a discussion of the background and
history of the doctrine of official absolute immunity culminating in
the Westfall decision and Congress' response to that decision. This
Note concludes that the Act is generally beneficial to both the fed-
eral government and to plaintiffs injured by the government. The
benefits to the government, however, are weightier and as a result
this factor should be taken into account by the federal courts when
acting as the ultimate arbiter of the Act's scope and effect.
I. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT
A. Westfall v. Erwin
On February 8, 1984, William T. Erwin, Sr., a civilian warehouse
employee at the Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, Alabama, was
injured when he was exposed to toxic soda ash at the depot." In his
complaint, Erwin alleged that while working at the depot, he inhaled
ash which had spilled from improperly stored bags.9 As a result, Er-
win allegedly suffered chemical burns to his eyes and throat, perma-
nent injury to his vocal cords, and emotional and mental distress.10
Erwin brought suit in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Ala-
5. 108 S. Ct. at 583.
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1965).
7. H.R. 4612, § 4-8.
8. Westfall was the Chief of the Receiving Section at the Depot.
9. 108 S. Ct. at 582.
10. Erwin v. Westfall, 785 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986).
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bama on February 7, 1985 against Westfall and two other supervi-
sors who worked at the depot. The supervisors removed the action to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama. That court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants on June 5, 1985, on the ground that the defendant supervisors
were immune from common law torts."' This finding was made, ac-
cording to the district court, in view of the fact that the alleged tort
was committed while the defendants were acting within the scope of
their employment.' 2
The district court relied on Johns v. Pettibone Corp.'3 in which
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "absent an allega-
tion of a tort of constitutional magnitude, federal officials are enti-
tled to absolute immunity for ordinary torts committed within the
scope of their jobs."' 4
Erwin then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit which reversed and
remanded.15 In a per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that at the time the defendants' motion for summary judgment was
before the district court, Pettibone was good law. Subsequent to the
district court's ruling, however, the opinion in Pettibone was with-
drawn and modified twice.' 6 Ultimately, the holding in Pettibone
stated that "a government employee enjoys immunity only if the
challenged conduct is a discretionary act and is within the outer pe-
rimeter of the actor's line of duty."'1 The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
for Westfall because the additional element of the immunity test was
absent - whether the conduct complained of was discretionary or
not.' 8
It was the dispute among circuit courts as to the necessity of the
discretionary prong which prompted the United States Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in Westfall.19 The Supreme Court subse-
quently affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and held that
federal employees would be liable for injuries associated with their
11. Id. at 1552.
12. Id.
13. 755 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1486 (quoting Clause v. Gyorkey, 674 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1982)).
15. Westfall, 785 F.2d at 1553.
16. Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 755 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir.), op. withdrawn, rev'd
and remanded, 769 F.2d 724 (11th Cir. 1985), affid on reh'g, 843 F.2d 464 (11th Cir.
1988).
17. 769 F.2d at 728.
18. Westfall, 785 F.2d at 1552.
19. Westfall v. Erwin, 107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987).
official conduct unless the actions were within the scope of their em-
ployment and involved the exercise of governmental discretion.20
B. Congress Responds
In issuing its decision in Westfall, the Supreme Court explicitly
stated that "Congress is in the best position to provide guidance for
the complex and often highly empirical inquiry into whether absolute
immunity is warranted in a particular context. Legislated standards
governing the immunity of federal employees involved in state-law
tort action would be useful."21 Recognizing that the Westfall deci-
sion would result in substantial personal liability exposure for the
entire federal workforce, the Honorable Barney Frank,22 a represen-
tative from Massachusetts, introduced H.R. 4358 before the
House.23
On April 12, 1988, Mssrs. Frank, Shaw, Fish,24 and Wolf intro-
duced H.R. 4358,25 the precursor bill to H.R. 4612, with the stated
purpose of "[a]mend[ing] title 28, United States Code, to provide
for an exclusive remedy against the United States for suits based
upon certain negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of United
States employees committed within the scope of their employment,
and for other purposes. 26 Soon thereafter, the bill was referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. 27
Two days later, on April 14, a hearing was conducted before the
House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Re-
lations to consider H.R. 4358.28 During the hearing, testimony from
a variety of witnesses was received, the majority of which favored
adoption of the legislation. On June 14, 1988, Representative Frank
submitted the Judiciary Committee's report on the amended and re-
numbered bill, H.R. 4612.29 The committee amended the legislation,
and unanimously recommended to the Full House that the bill be
passed.30
20. Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 585.
21. Id.
22. Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations.
23. H.R. 4358, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
24. Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
25. H.R. 4358, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
26. Id.
27. For a detailed discussion on the mechanics of the federal legislative process,
see generally E. WILLET, How OUR LAws ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 158, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1985).
28. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on H.R. 358
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Govtl. Relations of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
29. H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
30. Id. at 10.
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The contents of the Committee Report contain a summary of the
key testimony received during the Subcommittee hearing. This re-
port substantially follows the Department of Justice's (D.O.J.) sixty-
six page statement submitted by Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Robert L. Willmore.31 The need for a legislative response to Westfall
was summarized by the D.O.J. as follows:
In short, we are now faced with an immediate crisis of personal liability
exposure for the entire federal workforce. Virtually all federal employees,
and particularly rank and file employees, face the possibility of being re-
quired to defend a lawsuit in which his or her personal fortune is at stake,
even though the actions complained of clearly were official duties. There
thus is a new climate of uncertainty wherein federal employees have no way
of knowing whether they are protected when they act, or whether even the
most routine of their official duties will expose them to a lawsuit jeopardiz-
ing their personal assets.32
On June 27, 1988, the unanimous passage of H.R. 4612 by both
the Subcommittee and the Full committee was reported to the Full
House."3 In addressing the House, Representative Frank pointed out
that the bill does not apply to cases that allege violations of constitu-
tional rights,34 and that the Act was merely restoring the status quo
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.35
Rising in support of H.R. 4612, Representative Wolf stated: "[I]t
is unconscionable to ask Government employees, who have no rea-
sonable way of knowing whether they are protected when they act,
to make decisions or take actions capable of spawning tort
lawsuits."' 6
A quorum not being present in the House, a vote was suspended
until June 28, 1988, on which date two-thirds of the House voted to
pass H.R. 4612.31 The bill was then received by the Senate on July
6, 1988, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 8
While the House of Representatives considered H.R. 4612, the
Senate introduced its own version of the Act on June 13, 1988.39
Senate Bill 2500, introduced by Senator Grassley and co-authored
31. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 64.
33. 134 CONG. REc. H4718 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank).
34. Persons alleging constitutional torts will, under the Act, remain free to pursue
a remedy against an individual employee if they so choose. See generally Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
35. 134 CONG. REc. H4718 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank).
36. Id.
37. 134 CONG. REc. H4804 (daily ed. June 28, 1988).
38. 134 CONG. REc. S8900 (daily ed. July 6, 1988).
39. 134 CONG. REC. S7668 (daily ed. June 13, 1988).
by Mssrs. Humphrey, Trible, and Stevens, closely tracked the lan-
guage of H.R. 4612. Senate Bill 2500 was reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee with an amendment, offered by Senator Heflin,
on October 5, 1988.40 The unpublished Committee report produced a
bill which would include employees of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA) within the scope of protection offered by H.R. 4612.41 In
general, the Senate amendment gives immunity from liability for
common law torts to employees of the TVA who act in the scope of
their employment, by providing the Federal Tort Claims Act as the
exclusive remedy.42
On October 12, 1988, the Full Senate considered H.R. 4612 and
whether to amend it to include the TVA language. 43 The Full Senate
agreed to the amendment and passed H.R. 4612 with the TVA lan-
guage included." The House of Representatives, on October 20,
1988, considered the Senate amendment and found it to be
favorable, two-thirds having voted in favor. 45 H.R. 4612, with the
Senate amendment, was enrolled and submitted to President Reagan
who signed the bill into law on November 18, 1988.46
II. THE HISTORY OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Federal officials and employees have generally been immune from
tort liability by virtue of a doctrine known as absolute official immu-
nity.47 The doctrine finds its roots not in statutory form but as a
matter of federal law "to be formulated by the courts in the absence
of legislative action by Congress. '' 48 The rationale behind such a
broad sweep of absolute immunity is to "insulate the decision mak-
ing process [of federal officials] from the harassment of prospective
litigation," 49 and to abrogate the threat of liability which could im-
pede the effective administration of government.50 The scope of pro-
tection afforded to federal officials, however, has not existed without
disagreement among federal courts of appeal.
The history of federal official immunity can be traced to the early
40. 134 CONG. REC. S14,608 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988).
41. 52500, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 9 (1988).
42. Id.
43. 134 CONG. REC. S15,597 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988).
44. 134 CONG. REC. S15,600 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988).
45. 134 CONG. REc. H10,678 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988).
46. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988).
47. Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 583 (1988). The doctrine encompasses
damages suits against government employees or officials acting in their personal capacity.
(The terms "employees" and "officials" are used interchangeably throughout the case
law and thus throughout this Note.)
48. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959).
49. Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583.
50. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1969).
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nineteenth century. In Little v. Barreme,51 a United States naval of-
ficer seized a ship thought to be violating a federal act which prohib-
ited trade with the French. Chief Justice Marshall held that since
Captain Little did not have authority to seize Barreme's ship under
the Act, he should be held personally liable for Barreme's
damages. 52
Throughout the nineteenth century, federal courts offered little or
no protection to federal officials and employees against tort actions. 53
A trend emerged in 1875, however, as illustrated by Lamar v.
Browne,54 whereby the Supreme Court indicated its willingness to
extend tort immunity to federal officials when their actions fell
within prescribed boundaries. In Lamar, United States Treasury
agents were granted immunity from allegedly converting cotton
bales, a violation of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of
1863. 51 The Supreme Court held that the agents were protected by
the doctrine of offical immunity as they had acted for the govern-
ment and within the scope of their powers. 56 This case and others
like it set the stage for increased extension of the immunity doctrine
during the late 1800s.
The latter half of the nineteenth century ushered in one of the
most influential decisions to shape the immunity doctrine. In Spald-
ing v. Vilas,57 an attorney brought suit against the Postmaster Gen-
eral alleging that the latter had published a letter intending to injure
the attorney's reputation and to interfere with his business relations.
Upholding the Postmaster's demurrer, the Supreme Court intro-
duced a test to define the circumstances under which immunity
would attach. Justice Harlan's majority opinion stated: "[A]ction[s]
having more or less connection with the general matters committed
by law to [the federal officials'] control or supervision" would be im-
munized from tort liability. 8
51. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
52. Id. at 175. Captain Little was held liable for $8,504.00 in damages.
53. See Mitchell v. Harmoney, 54 U.S. (13 How) 115 (1851) (Army officers held
liable for conversion of merchant's property); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (Army
officers sued for seizing whiskey from merchants in the Dakota Territory); Hendricks v.
Gonzalez, 67 F. 351 (2d Cir. 1895) (U.S. Customs agent held liable for mistakenly be-
lieving a cargo ship was loaded with arms and thus in violation of international neutrality
laws).
54. 92 U.S. 187 (1875).
55. Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (1863).
56. Lamar, 92 U.S. at 196.
57. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
58. Id. at 498.
Thus, the outer limits of a federal employee's duty were defined to
be acts carried out pursuant to the functions of the particular de-
partment or agency within the government. The often quoted ration-
ale for federal official immunity was set out in Spalding as follows:
[A federal official] should not be under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of
inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and
effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive
branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint ....
But if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation
of a suit against him personally for damages .... 59
Spalding, while making great strides in the area of official immu-
nity, was generally followed for its limited holding that agency or
department heads could publish information or speak concerning the
operation of their agencies, without fear of retaliatory suit.60 Spald-
ing's progeny also limited immunity to executive officials, rarely ex-
tending it to lower level employees. As suits against government offi-
cials continued to be filed, lower courts found that they were
required to balance two conflicting interests. The first was the right
of private citizens to be free from oppressive or malicious action on
the part of federal officials, and the second was the need to protect
the government from vexatious lawsuits thought to inhibit the fear-
less execution of federal policy.61 It was not until sixty-three years
after Spalding that the Supreme Court addressed this balancing test
in the case of Barr v. Matteo.6 2
Barr involved a libel suit filed by subordinate officials against their
superior, the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. The
defendant had suspended his subordinates and published his reasons
for doing so in a press release.6" The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals declined to extend absolute immunity because the state-
ments were made outside the line of duty, and because the defendant
was not of Cabinet ranking.64 The Supreme Court reversed on both
grounds. In addressing the issue of rank, Justice Harlan wrote:
The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expres-
sion of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.
The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so
great that there must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of au-
thority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions be-
come less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower
59. Id. at 498-99.
60. See, e.g., Mellon v. Brewer, '18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S.
530 (1927) (Secretary of the Treasury granted immunity); Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d
769 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Chairman of the Federal Tariff Commission granted immunity).
61. See Comment, supra note 4, at 294.
62. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
63. Id. at 565-67.
64. Barr v. Matteo, 244 F.2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 355 U.S. 171 (1957).
[VOL. 26: 137, 1989] Westfall v. Erwin
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
rank in the executive heirarchy.6 5
Thus, the doctrine of immunity was, for the first time, explicitly
extended to all federal government officials, regardless of rank, so
long as the acts were in the "outer perimeter""6 of the officials' line
of duty. The Barr Court stated:
We think that under these circumstances a publicly expressed statement of
the position of the agency head, announcing personnel action which he
planned to take in reference to the charges so widely disseminated to the
public, was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that
rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively. . . .The
fact that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's
line of duty is enough to render the privilige applicable . . .67
Although it seemed a straightforward solution to the immunity is-
sue, Justice Harlan's opinion in Barr led to the very dispute among
the circuits which the Westfall Court set out to resolve. Most of
Harlan's analysis focused on delineating the boundaries of the dis-
cretionary function. However, the Barr Court rendered the privilege
of immunity applicable simply because the acts of the director were
within the outer perimeter of his line of duty.68
Barr, while remaining good law, was followed for different pro-
positions by different federal courts. Some circuits required the dis-
cretionary function prong of Barr, 9 while others required only the
outer perimeter prong.70 Thus, not only was Barr applied inconsis-
tently, lower courts were left without precise definitions for "acts of
discretion" and "outer perimeter of duty."
The Westfall Court settled the dispute among the circuits and re-
quired that both prongs be met, sending shock waves throughout the
ranks of federal employees and officials. The Westfall decision was
seen as pulling the rug out from under federal workers and creating
a workplace filled with fear.71 Until Westfall, the majority of actions
against federal employees acting in their personal capacities were
65. 360 U.S. at 572-73.
66. Id. at 575.
67. Id. at 574-75.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Dretar v. Smith, 752 F.2d 1015, 1017 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); Araujo v.
Welch, 742 F.2d 802, 804 (3d Cir. 1984); George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1105 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981) (implying the requirement); Green v. James,
473 F.2d 660, 661 (9th Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (4th
Cir. 1987); Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1986); Lojuk v. Johnson, 770
F.2d 619, 626 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067 (1986); Ricci v. Key
Bancshares of Me., Inc., 768 F.2d 456, 463-64 (1st Cir. 1985).
71. 134 CONG. REc. S15,599 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
145
unsuccessful. Cases were resolved early through summary judgment
or dismissal. These motions succeeded because it was possible to at
least argue that the employee was acting within the scope of employ-
ment. Federal employees, especially lower ranking functionaries per-
forming ministerial duties, were left after Westfall not knowing
whether the most routine of their official duties would expose them
to state tort lawsuits jeopardizing their personal assets.7 2
After Westfall, these fears were also well founded when one
looked closely at the impact of the discretionary function require-
ment. The earliest judicial attempts to define the limits of a discre-
tionary act distinguished between acts involving policy making or
discretionary functions and those which are purely ministerial. 3 The
majority rule among the circuits has been that an official will gener-
ally be held immune as long as the duty performed was purely non-
ministerial.
The Second Circuit set out a definition for discretionary acts
which can be summarized as follows: "[I]s the act complained of the
result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the gov-
ernment official be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious
or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability? ' 75 It was argued
that this broad definition of discretion was appropriate as a great
number of decisions are made by federal officials who do not hold
policy-making positions. This rule, however, leaves lower echelon
federal employees liable for their actions while those of their policy-
making superiors are protected. Indeed, lawmakers in both the
House and the Senate focused on Westfall's effect on lower ranking
employees in their reports and floor debates." Examples of hypothet-
ical post-Westfall claims included suits for tortious breach of con-
tract against government contracting officers; suits against park
rangers for injuries suffered at sites supervised or operated by the
National Park Service; and suits against maintenance personnel for
misplaced electrical cords or improperly mopped floors that may
have caused injuries." Actions of this nature would have potentially
72. 134 CONG. REC. S15,599 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Grassley). It could be argued that all lower ranking employees, post-Westfall, were in-
deed certain that their tortious acts committed within the scope of their duties would
trigger personal liability.
73. Ministerial acts are those required by a higher authority. See Heine v. Raus,
399 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968).
74. See generally Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965); In re Estate
of Burks v. Ross, 438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971); David v. Cohen, 407 F.2d 1268 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
75. Ore Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963).
76. See generally H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); and 134
CONG. REc. S15,599 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
77. H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
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threatened the personal assets of these officers. Ironically, even
though Westfall created an entire class of potential defendants,
lower ranking employees are not necessarily capable of satisfying
large tort judgments. 8
Even though Westfall was yet to be tested, the specter of defend-
ing protracted personal liability suits on all three levels of the federal
government prompted the quick response from Congress in the form
of House of Representative Bill 4612.
III. How THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT HAS BEEN AMENDED
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1964 to
redress the many wrongs for which victims of governmental torts
could find no remedy.7 9 The FTCA enables plaintiffs to bring tort
actions in federal court against the federal government, its agents
and employees, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant."0 The FTCA, in one
stroke, did away with the antiquated notion that the "king can do no
wrong" by providing that the federal government shall be liable in
tort "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances." 8'
House of Representative Bill 4612, as enacted, provides that the
exclusive remedy for common law torts committed by federal em-
ployees"2 within the scope of their employment is through an action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 3 Sub-
stantial precedent for such an exclusive remedy provision exists, in-
cluding provisions protecting federal employees in the negligent op-
eration of an automobile,"4  a provision protecting Defense
Department attorneys,8 5 and provisions protecting federally em-
ployed medical personnel.8 8
78. 134 CONG. REC. S15,599 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
79. For a thorough discussion of the history of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-30 (1953).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
81. Id.
82. The Act is intended to protect officers and employees of all three branches of
government from Westfall-type suits. See H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5945.
83. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)).
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80.
85. 10 U.S.C. § 1054.
86. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (Defense Department medical personnel); 22
Section 2671 of title 28 has now been amended to extend coverage
of the FTCA to officers and employees of the legislature and judicial
branches. 7
Section 2674 of title 28 has now been amended to provide that the
United States may assert any defense based on the judicial or legis-
lative immunity of judicial and congressional employees along with
any other defenses a private person would be able to assert, such as
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.88 This provision has
already come under attack by one legislator as possibly violating the
long accepted doctrine of respondeat superior. 9
Section 2679(d) of title 28 has now been amended to provide for
the substitution of the United States as the defendant in cases where
the federal employee acted in the course and scope of his employ-
mentY0 This remedy is exclusive, precluding any other civil action or
civil suit for money damages from being lodged against the employee
or his estate.9 1 This amendment also makes clear that the exclusive
remedy provision does not extend to constitutional torts or to causes
of action brought against an individual under another statute.9 2
Section 2679(d) of title 28 has also been amended to require that
the United States be substituted as the sole defendant whenever the
Attorney General determines that the act or omission alleged to have
caused the claimant's injuries was within the scope of office or em-
ployment.9 3 Upon such a determination, any action in state court
shall be removed to a federal district court.9 4 If the-Attorney Gen-
eral refuses to certify the employee as having acted within course
and scope, the employee may petition the district court for a ruling
U.S.C. § 2458(a) (NASA medical personnel); 38 U.S.C. § 4116 (VA medical person-
nel); 22 U.S.C. § 2702 (State Department physicians); 42 U.S.C. § 233 (Public Health
Service physicians).
87. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 3, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
83. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 4, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
89. The majority rule at common law in the private employment context is that
an employer, sued for the tortious acts of its employee, may not invoke the employee's
remedies under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Hearing on H.R. 4358, Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
41 (1988) (letter to Rep. Barney Frank from Rep. Don Edwards).
90. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 6, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)).
91. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1)). See
also H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5945.
92. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4564.(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)).
93. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 6, 102 Stat. 4564 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)).
94. Id.
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on this determination. 95 Civil actions against the United States
which are dismissed for failure to first file an administrative claim
pursuant to the requirements of the FTCA will be treated as timely
if: (1) the claim would have been timely filed on the date that the
underlying civil action was commenced; and (2) if a proper claim is
filed with the appropriate federal agency within sixty days after dis-
missal of the civil action. 98
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE ACT
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation
Act of 1988 was intended to be an evenhanded response to
Westfall 7 The legislators believe that the Act will fairly compen-
sate tort victims while adequately protecting federal employees from
personal liability for actions taken in the course and scope of federal
employment.9 Plaintiffs seeking redress against federal employees
will be limited to the exclusive remedy of suing the United States, as
the sole defendant, under the FTCA.
The Act provides a test to determine whether the complained-of
act was committed within an employee's scope of employment:
"whether the employee's acts are an incident of, a part of, or in fur-
therance of, the employee's employment." 99 Before the Act, federal
courts consistently looked to descriptions of job .responsibilities °0 or
statutory authorizations"'0 in deciding whether federal employees
were acting within their official scope. The United States will not be
substituted as the sole defendant if an employee is accused of egre-
gious misconduct and the Attorney General so certifies.
The FTCA provides that the determination of whether an em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his employment is to be gov-
erned by the law of the state in which the alleged wrongful conduct
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 134 CONG. REC. S15,599 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
98. Id. at S15,600.
99. Kemerer v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 731, 733 (W.D. Pa. 1971), a f'd, 474
F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973). In the case of a member of the military, Naval Forces, or
National Guard, "acting within the scope of office or employment ... means acting in
the line of duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
100. See General Electric Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1273, 1279 (4th Cir.
1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 743 (1988); Poolman v.
Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1986).
101. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 322 (1973).
occurred.102 One commentator has set out ten separate factors to be
considered in making this determination. Among them are: the time,
place, and purpose of the act; was the act one commonly done by the
employee; was the act outside the enterprise of the employer; was the
act entrusted to the employee; was the act one the employer ex-
pected to be done; was the instrumentality by which the harm was
done furnished by the employer to the employee; was the act a de-
parture from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized re-
sult; and whether the act was seriously criminal. 10 3
The Act explicitly governs all claims which accrue after the date
of enactment: November 18, 1988. The provisions of the Act will
also apply to claims which have not been reduced to final judgment
on the date of enactment, regardless of when the claims accrued.104
Plaintiffs who have a claim, but have not initiated a lawsuit, will be
permitted to submit their administrative claim against the United
States for up to two years after the date of enactment, or within the
time remaining under the applicable state statute of limitations,
whichever is longer.' 0 5 Last, plaintiffs who have initiated a lawsuit
but have not filed their administrative claims will have at least sixty
days after dismissal of the civil action to file, if the filing of the suit
was timely under state law.' 06
The Act will probably result in a cost savings to the federal gov-
ernment. 10 7 Prior to this legislation, defendants in Westfall actions
were represented by the United States Attorney when the defend-
ant's actions were within the scope of their employment. After the
Act, even though the United States Attorney will represent the
United States as the sole defendant, the action will progress under
the FTCA resulting in a cost savings to the government as FTCA
defenses are less costly.'0 The unavailability of punitive damages
will also result in lower costs to the government. 0
A. How the Act Favors Claimants
From the perspective of an injured plaintiff, the ability to sue the
United States under the FTCA presents certain advantages over a
suit against an individual federal employee. With regards to uncom-
plicated claims, the FTCA contains an adminstrative claims proce-
102. Davies v. United States, 542 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1976).
103. 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS, § 216.01 n.9 (1988).
104. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 8, 102 Stat. 4565 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1988) (Report from Con-
gressional Budget Office).
108. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
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dure whereby certain claims may be expeditiously settled, for an
amount not greater than $25,000.00.110 If the claim is disapproved
or if the agency offers an amount in settlement which the claimant
regards as insufficient, the claimant may proceed to litigation. This
can be viewed as having "two bites at the apple instead of one."' ' 1
The most important advantage lies in the fact that while a major
percentage of federal employees may be unable to satisfy a judg-
ment, the United States would be able to pay any judgment that is
awarded.
B. Disadvantages of the Exclusive Remedy
The current provisions of the FTCA require that an administrative
claim must be filed as an initial step in the claimant's pursuit of
money damages.1  Furthermore, no suit may be brought until after
the claim has been denied by the agency.'1 3 This less time consum-
ing and less expensive remedy must be considered in light of the fact
that the administrative claim will be reviewed and adjudicated by
the agency which allegedly committed the wrongful act. Secondly,
submission of an administrative claim with the required supporting
documents without equal disclosure of the government's position
may result in a tactical disadvantage if the claim is subsequently
denied.
Attorney's fees are limited under the FTCA. For claims accruing
on or after January 18, 1967, fees connected to administrative settle-
ment are limited to twenty percent of the recovery and twenty-five
percent after suit has been brought." 4 Recovery under the FTCA is
also limited to compensatory damages. 16 Pre-judgment interest and
punitive damages are not recoverable." 6 If state law provides only
punitive damages for wrongful death, the government's liability is
still measured by compensatory damages117
The limitation on attorney's fees may ultimately result in decreas-
ing willingness among plaintiff's attorneys to accept cases like
Westfall. Futhermore, no allowance for fees is made for the attorney
who takes the case up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. 1988).
111. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 103, § 2 (1977).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
113. Id.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2678.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
116. Id.
117. Id.
Court. If the attorney does decide to take the claimant's cause to the
courtroom, actions under the FTCA are conducted without a jury,118
a fact not entirely beneficial to a tort plaintiff.
As an exclusive remedy, the FTCA may prove to be a drier well
than proposed by the Act's supporters. As the sole party defendant,
the United States government may take advantage of the numerous
exceptions and exclusions within the FTCA to avoid liability." 9 The
express exclusions to the FTCA are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 and
fall into three general categories: exclusions based on the perform-
ance of discretionary functions or duties; 20 exclusions related to par-
ticular types of governmental activities;' and exclusions related to
specific torts.122 For the purposes of this Note, the first two are im-
portant as there is a good chance that, in claims arising out of the
specific torts category, a finding will be rendered that the employee
acted outside the scope of his office, thus providing the claimant with
an alternate remedy against the employee.
The most litigated exclusion surrounds claims "based upon the ex-
ercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal . . . employee of
the government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.' 23 Application of the discretionary exclusion is not condi-
tional on the exercise of due care and may apply whether or not
negligence was present. 124 The reason for such immunity parallels
the doctrine of sovereign immunity discussed above. In passing the
FTCA, Congress intended to protect a certain class of governmental
actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. "In
sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the Government
from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the permis-
sible exercise of policy judgment."' 25 This exception to liability in
the FTCA is important with respect to the Act as the government
may easily argue that a particular defendant's acts were discretion-
ary in nature and as such escape FTCA liability.
After passage of the Act, a claimant will be unable to seek redress
from the government if the district court determines that the defend-
ant's actions were of a sufficient discretionary nature to render the
exclusion applicable. 28 Exact definitions of the exclusion are varied,
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. 1988).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)-(g), (i)-(n).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
124. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33-34 (1953).
125. Berkovitz By Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
126. For a general discussion of the discretionary function exception as a bar to
federal jurisdiction, see Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception: Is It A Bar
[VOL. 26: 137, 1989] Westfall v. Erwin
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
however, there are guidelines which can prove useful in estimating
its boundaries. The exclusion will apply to "a [government] function
or duty which necessarily requires the exercise of reason in the adop-
tion of means to an end, discretion as to how, when, or where an
action shall be done .. ,u . However, it is not the status or level
of the actor which governs the application of the exclusion but the
discretionary nature of the challenged conduct.128
In 1984, the Supreme Court broadly construed the discretionary
function exception in the case of United States v. yarig Airlines.29
The Supreme Court in Yarig held that an allegedly negligent inspec-
tion by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the airliner's
lavatory could not give rise to tort liability under the FTCA.1 0 The
Court held:
[T]he basic inquiry concerning the application of the discretionary function
exception is whether the challenged acts of a government employee -
whatever his or her rank - are of the nature and quality that Congress in-
tended to shield from tort liability.
Second, whatever else the discretionary function exception may include,
it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the govern-
ment acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals
... .Congress wished to prevent judicial "second guessing" in social, eco-
nomic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.13 1
Unfortunately, for attorneys representing FTCA claimants, Varig
did not provide a workable definition of discretionary acts. An earlier
Supreme Court case, Dalehite v. United States,32 set out a planning
versus operational test to assist in defining discretionary limita-
tions.133 The Dalehite Court held that decisions made at the plan-
ning level would be immune under the discretionary exclusion while
those at the implementation level would not.13 4
After Varig, it is unclear whether the operational-planning distinc-
tion survives. Some writers have argued that the discretionary con-
duct focus of Varig has abrogated the distinction135 while others as-
sert that Dalehite remains the test for the applicability of section
To Federal Jursidiction?, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 117 (1983).
127. Mims v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 839, 843 (W.D. Va. 1972).
128. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226
(1984).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 821.
131. Id. at 813-14 (footnotes omitted).
132. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id.
135. See Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnston v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 434 (D. Kan. 1984).
2680(a).11
More recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to restate and
clarify the scope of the discretionary function in Berkovitz By
Berkovitz v. United States.137 In Berkovitz, the United States was
sued under the FTCA for approval of production and distribution of
a defectively manufactured polio vaccine.13 8 The Court held that
"the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action
for an employee to follow.' 39 Justice Marshall, writing for a unani-
mous Court stated: "In examining the nature of the challenged con-
duct, a court must first consider whether the action is a matter of
choice for the acting employee . . . conduct cannot be discretionary
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice."' 140 Thus, where
a federal employee has no rightful option but to adhere to federal
guidelines and as such, the employee's conduct cannot appropriately
be the product of free choice of judgment, the discretionary function
is inapplicable for there has not been an exercise of discretion.,
Berkovitz stands for the proposition that the government may not
hide from liability under the discretionary function when the alleged
conduct was the result of a statutory guideline. This is a benefit to
claimants under the FTCA and the new Act as a diligent plaintiff's
attorney may, depending on the facts of the case, argue that the gov-
ernment employee's decisional conduct, was pursuant to one of the
numerous government statutes and/or regulatory programs of fed-
eral agencies." Whichever test a district court chooses, one thing is
clear: the Government by enacting House of Representatives Bill
4612 has provided an exclusive remedy in which lies a broad and
largely undefined exclusion that can be fatal to an otherwise bona
fide claim.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Employees Liability and Tort Compensation Act of
1988 is an attempt to clear the muddled waters of the doctrine of
federal official immunity. For decades, federal courts had applied in-
consistent and varied tests to determine when a grant of immunity
136. See Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523,
1527 (1 th Cir. 1985); Drake Towing Co., Inc. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co., 765 F.2d
1060, 1064 (11th Cir. 1985); 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 103, § 248.01.
137. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
138. Id. at 1957.
139. Id. at 1958.
140. Id.
141. 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59.
142. But note, however, that the discretionary function exception was not designed
to cover all acts of regulatory agencies and their employees, but only such acts as are
discretionary in nature. See, H.R. Rap. No. 1287, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1945).
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should be extended to federal officials or employees acting within the
scope of their employment. The Westfall v. Erwin decision was per-
ceived by Congress as creating a crisis in the federal workplace by
virtue of its holding which would immunize upper level employees
while leaving lower ranking employees liable. Congress responded to
Justice Marshall's express invitation to consider the issue and to
fashion a more appropriate legislative solution.
The Act appears to be both sword and shield at the same time. By
providing claimants with the FTCA as an exclusive remedy, injured
plaintiffs have potential access to an efficient administrative claims
procedure and the nation's most solvent defendant. On the other
hand, the FTCA contains numerous restrictions and exclusions
which could leave claimants who are clearly injured at the behest of
a negligent sovereign without an alternate source of redress. All in
all, the newly enacted legislation appears to be an even-handed ap-
proach to the complex and delicate task of balancing the need to
protect a nation's citizens with the need to protect its civil servants.
Only time and the manner in which the district courts apply the Act
will be the ultimate arbiters of the Act's effectiveness and fairness.
WILLIAM T. CORNELL

